



## **Family Status and Women's Career Mobility in Post-reform Urban China<sup>†</sup>**

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### **Abstract**

This article examines how family status affects women's career mobility in post-reform urban China. The market reform facilitates the separation of public and private spheres, which were once integrated during the socialist era, thereby increasing tension between work and family, and making marriage and children obstacles for women's career mobility. Analyses of the retrospective data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) in 2008 show that Chinese women in the workforce are more adversely affected by marriage and children than their male counterparts, and that they are more likely to withdraw from the labor force to fulfill their roles as wives and mothers and less likely to move up career ladders. This pattern was more prominent in the late reform stage (1999-2008) than in the early reform stages (1978-1992 and 1993-1998). These findings have important implications for understanding rising gender inequality in the labor market and contribute to the formulation of effective social policies to promote gender egalitarianism in urban China.

## Introduction

Women typically take a greater share of responsibility for household duties than men do, and transitions to marriage and parenthood tend to enhance such traditional gender division of labor within family (i.e., Bianchi et al. 2000; Bianchi and Milkie 2010; Gupta 1999). As married women spend more time and effort on housework and childcare, they have less time available for career development. As a result, married women with children are less likely to find jobs after taking maternity leave and more likely to withdraw from the labor market, and such career interruptions may limit their promotion chances and earnings growth (Becker 1991).

While women's reproductive role (e.g., marriage and childbirth) is universal, its effects on their productive work in labor markets could vary across societies with different institutional arrangements and social welfare systems (e.g., Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 1999; Esping-Andersen 1990; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). In contemporary Western welfare states, studies have shown that certain social and family policies, such as paid parental leave and subsidized childcare, ease the conflict between paid work and household work for women, thus supporting gender equality (e.g., Chang 2015; Gornick and Jacobs 1998; Orloff 1993; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk 2002).

Historically, in socialist urban China, the state-owned work unit (*danwei*) provided social services, including housing, dining halls, and infant daycare in or near the workplace (Bian 1994; Walder 1986, 1992). These services alleviated women's housework burdens, such as meal preparation and child care, and made it easier for women to participate in the labor force.

Hence, the state plays an important role in promoting gender equality, not only through legal regulations that prohibit open discrimination against women in the labor market (e.g., Beller 1982), but also through various institutional supports to reduce the tension between work and family responsibilities, be they social and family policies in welfare states, or encompassing work units that “socialized” some of women’s reproductive responsibilities in state socialist China. While numerous cross-national studies have examined gender inequality under various welfare regimes (Esping-Anderson 1999), few have paid attention to how the impact of marriage and childbirth on women’s labor market chances would be modified by a fundamental change of welfare regimes, because the institutional linkages between family and work remain largely stable in most developed countries.

To a certain extent, the work unit system in urban China can be considered a type of welfare regime, and the transition from a socialist redistributive economy to a market economy implies the reconfiguration of institutional arrangements between work and family, thus providing a unique chance for scholars to examine how the role of women’s reproductive responsibilities in their career advancement has been affected by such reconfigurations in the process of the economic reform.

In this research, we employ a conceptual framework of two-sphere separation adopted from Western family studies but modified to fit the specific context of gender equality under China’s socialism. We argue that in the state-owned enterprise reform, many social services once shouldered by the state have been shifted back to families, escalating work-family conflicts for women. We employ the retrospective life history data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) in 2008 and event history analyses to empirically investigate the impact of marriage and parenthood on career

mobility and how the effects differ between men and women at different stages of reform in China.

### **Family, Work, and Women's Career Contingency: A Perspective of the Two-sphere Separation**

The concept of two spheres – the public and the private – dates back to Aristotle (Arendt 1958; Stauffer 2008). The framework of two-sphere separation was first applied to conventional research on families and sex roles, in which families were seen as a close units in the private sphere, while the public sphere was composed of social institutions, such as politics or the economy (Ferree 1990). In the bifurcated view of separateness, women assume a distinct role in the private sphere, complementary to that of their husbands as the breadwinners of the families. They give birth, raise children, and take care of domestic work, while their husbands focus on work in the public sphere (Adams 2011). The notion of separate spheres legitimized gender role differentiation (e.g., Connell 1985; Lopata and Thorne 1978) by excluding women from participating in the production process, thus rendering them subordination to and dependent upon men (Edwards 2001).

The separate-sphere ideology, stemming from the early industrialization context in the West, had been criticized by historian and feminist theorists since the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, because the path to separation may be historically specific, family is an integral part of the wider systems of economic and political power, and family members may have divergent and sometimes conflicting interests (Ferree 1990). Women have been increasingly engaged in paid work since the 1950s (Costa 2000; Goldin 1990; Juhn and Potter 2006). The rate of female labor force participation in the United States, for instance, had increased from 33.9 percent in 1950 to 66.9 percent in 2015 for those aged 16 years or above (Fullerton 1999, 4). Gender earnings inequality

has declined over time, and the temporal change is closely associated with educational expansion, which clearly favors women (Goldin 1990; Hout and Diprete 2006; Reskin 1993; Shavit and Blossfeld 1993).

Ironically, while women have reached parity with or even exceeded men in educational attainment, the gender earnings gap persists in most developed countries (Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi 2009). To explain the sources of gender disparities in hiring, promotion, and earnings in the public sphere, scholars tend to point to men's and women's differential roles in the private sphere, and how employers discriminate based on those role expectations (Blau and Kahn 2007; Stone 2007). In other words, women often take on a greater share of housework than their spouses when they get married, and especially when they have young children. As a result, they are perceived to be less committed to the workplace and more likely to quit for family reasons, making them a risk to employers. Employed women are more likely to remain in lower-paid occupations, rather than entering professional careers with high economic returns dominated by men (e.g., Levanon and Grusky 2016; Marini 1989; Song et al. 2017). Even women who do pursue professional careers are more likely to leave either by withdrawing from the job market permanently or by switching to part-time employment after having children (Cha 2010, 2013; Jacobs 1989; Marini 1989; Stone 2007; Treiman and Hartmann 1981).

What can be done to level the playing field for women? We know from past experience that the tension between women's work and family responsibilities can be alleviated by social welfare systems (Corcoran et al. 2000; Esping-Anderson 1990, 1999; Gornick and Meyer 2003; Orloff 1993). Cross-national studies have shown that gender earnings gaps vary with the availability of employment in public sectors, paid

parental leave, childcare facilities, as well as the tax system, which may encourage or discourage women to work (DiPrete and McManus 2000; Gornick and Jacobs 1998; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk 2002). For instance, government support for paid leave and free childcare is found to be positively associated with women's full-time employment rate (Mandel and Semyonov 2006). Despite the fact that men generally benefit less than women from family policies, men also contribute more to domestic work when parental leave is extended to them (Hook 2006). Family policies that take into account both women's labor-market participation and men's childcare involvement are found to be particularly instrumental in promoting gender equality in Nordic countries (Guo and Xiao 2013).

While women's educational and occupational achievements have helped them bridge the gap between the public and private spheres and change the sphere boundary, the notion of two-sphere separation remains a useful analytical framework for explaining how women's careers are contingent upon their entrenched roles within families, and how those roles create obstacles for their advancement in the labor market.

Most extant studies are based on experience in developed countries where the institutional links between family and work have been relatively stable over time. Various social policies and welfare programs are instituted to foster converging and integrated spheres to reduce the family-work conflict. China's fast-paced transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy provides a unique historical setting and a non-Western context in which to examine the impact of removing the institutional arrangement between work and family on two-sphere separation in the opposite direction, thus affecting the dynamics of gender inequality.

## **Work Units, Marketization, and the Separation of Public-Private Spheres in Urban China**

Following Engels' argument that the premise for the emancipation of women is "the reintroduction of the entire female sex into public industry" (Engels 1978 [1891], 744), the Chinese Communist Party encouraged women to go outside the home after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 (Whyte and Parish 1984). The promotion of gender egalitarianism was implemented mainly through the newly instituted state-owned work units (*danwei*) (Wu 2002), which not only offered working women jobs security and strictly prohibited gender discrimination in pay, but also provided various kinds of benefits and social services, such as housing, childcare, dining hall services, etc. (Walder 1986, 1992). Housework that women were expected to shoulder, to some extent, was undertaken by the multi-functional work units. As a result, private families were seen as the "residual" place of "invisible domestic labor" in China (Hershatter 2003, 270-71), being transformed into a utilitarian tool to achieve the public goal of socialist production (Ji, Wu, and et. al. 2017; Ji and Wu 2018).

From the perspective of the two-sphere separation theory developed in the West, some Chinese scholars argued that gendered division of both paid and unpaid work was woven into the socialist production process, and family as a social institution in the private sphere was embedded in the public/state sphere, operated through the work unit (Song 2012). Other scholars proposed a slightly different model of the simultaneous "construction of both family and state," in which the state mandated families shared its goal on the one hand but also committed to providing welfare to families on the other hand (Zuo 2005; Zuo and Jiang 2013). Despite their differences,

both models highlighted the key role played by the state in mobilizing women to participate in the labor force (Ji, Wu et al. 2017).

During the socialist era, the state's effort to promote female labor force participation and gender equality was largely successful. Starting in the late 1950s and throughout the Maoist era, over 90 percent of urban Chinese women were employed, and gender discrimination was strictly prohibited (Wolf 1985; Zuo and Bian 2001). While women made these achievements in the public sphere, their traditional gender roles in the private sphere remained unchanged (Ji et al. 2017; Wolf 1985). Therefore, working women still suffered from the work-family conflict, although their double family-work burden was relieved to some extent by the relatively integrated public and private spheres within the work unit.

The introduction of market forces into a socialist redistributive economy has fundamentally altered the social stratification in China, and thus had a profound impact on gender inequality. Female labor force participation rates in urban China have dropped over time, from 89.4 percent for all women aged 21 to 50 as of in 1990 prior to the sweeping marketization to 63.5 percent in 2005 (Mauer-Fazio, Connelly, Chen and Tang 2011; Wu and Zhou 2015). Meanwhile, women's earnings relative to men's also declined, from 86.3 percent in 1988 to 76.2 percent in 2004 (Zhang, Hannum and Wang 2008; Song, Sicular and Gustafsson 2017). The role of work units in social stratification was undermined by marketization, the main force that drives the increasing gender earnings inequality in reform-era urban China (He and Wu 2018).

The enterprise reform attempted to convert work units into more profit-oriented entities that are less dependent on administrative fiats. Work units thus have gained

more autonomy in the recruitment, remuneration and dismissal of their employees than they had previously. After the life-long employment system with cradle-to-grave welfare in work units had been scrapped, women often became the victims of waves of restructuring and downsizing (Wu 2010). Meanwhile, the private sector grew into the most dynamic part of the Chinese economy, offering myriad job opportunities for school leavers and laid-off workers. Unlike their counterparts in the state sector, these private firms emphasized economic efficiency over social justice when recruiting employees, and they hired workers at their own discretion, with little government intervention. These structural changes in urban labor markets have allowed employers to exercise “statistical discrimination” against women in work assignment and compensation, anticipating that they would be less committed to work and also invest less into their careers upon marriage and birth giving (Cao and Hu 2007; Wu, Wang, and Huang 2016). The decline in women’s position within urban China’s labor market resulted from both direct discrimination and occupational segregation during marketization (He and Wu 2017, 2018).

Although the explanations for the enlarging gender gaps are primarily focused on the labor market process, the further probing of the issue necessarily points to women’s family roles. In China, as in most East Asian countries, marriage is nearly universal (Raymo, Park, Xie and Yeung 2015). Most women are expected to get married, give birth, and prioritize their family obligations over career development. With the decline of communist gender ideology once backed by the work unit, the traditional patriarchal values had been revived to a certain extent (Ji 2015; Ji et al. 2017). Research shows that Chinese women are more likely than men to opt out of paid labor if they have dependent children at home (Maurer-Fazio et al. 2011; Sun and

Chen 2017), and this negative effect would further intensify as the number of children increases (Yu and Xie 2014).

Childcare became a critical problem in the 1990s when most work units reduced or stopped providing care for employees' children. Many childcare facilities were scaled down, or transformed into service-for-fee programs. The number of publicly funded kindergartens decreased by about 2/3 from 1997 to 2006, and the private kindergarten increased from 13.5 percent to 57.8 percent of all childcare programs during the same period (Ministry of Education 2007). The responsibility for child care was returned to private families for solution, either in the marketplace via private kindergartners or through women's unpaid work at home (Cook and Dong 2011; Zuo and Jiang 2013).

Thus, in the analytical framework of public and private spheres, the market transition has facilitated the separation of the two spheres, which were once integrated in the work unit system. The transformation of the work unit, together with the decline of communist gender ideology, has escalated work-family conflicts (Wu, Wang, and Huang 2016), thus exacerbating the disadvantages of women, especially of married women, in the labor markets in the economic transition in urban China (Hughes and Maurer-Fazio 2002; Ji et al. 2017; Sun and Chen 2017).

## **Family Status and Women's Careers in the Market Transition: Research**

### **Hypotheses**

For single men and women who have just completed formal education and started their first jobs, there is little gender difference in career aspirations and occupational attainments and only a small gender wage gap (e.g., Loprest 1992; Manning and

Swaffield 2008). It is upon marriage, especially after childbirth, that women's career and earnings trajectories diverge from men's, presumably being interrupted by these life events in the private sphere. Those women who remain in the labor force are more likely to choose low-paying but flexible jobs to accommodate their family responsibilities (Killewald and Gough 2013; O'Neill 2003; Polacheck and Siebert 1993). There is a substantial amount of literature devoted to documenting the marriage (motherhood) penalty on earnings in Western countries (e.g., Budig and England 2001; Budig and Hodges 2010; England et al. 2016) and on careers (Looze 2014; Jacobs and Gerson 2004; Miller 2011). As the starting point of our investigation, we extended the marriage penalty to Chinese women's career development and proposed the following related hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1a:* Marriage has a negative impact on the likelihood of upward job mobility for women but not for men.

*Hypothesis 1b:* Women are more likely than men to leave the labor market after getting married.

Having children, especially young children, may further intensify the traditional gender division of labor, thus affecting women's chances to develop their own careers (Mu and Xie 2016; Zhang and Hannum 2015; Zhang, Hannum, and Wang 2008; Zuo and Bian 2001). Considering the similar effects of having dependent children as marriage on the outcomes concerned, we further propose to test the following hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 2a:* Having dependent children reduces one's likelihood of upward job mobility, particularly for married women.

*Hypothesis 2b:* Having dependent children increases one's likelihood of withdrawing from the labor force, particularly for married women.

The gradual dismantling of the work unit system led to the separation of the private sphere from the public sphere, creating increasing tension between family and career. Women, especially married women with young children, began to occupy more vulnerable positions in the labor market. Hence, the following hypotheses are testable:

*Hypothesis 3a:* The negative effects of marriage on women's upward job mobility and labor force participation are more prominent in the late reform period than before.

*Hypothesis 3b:* The negative effects of having dependent children on women's upward job mobility and labor force participation are more prominent in the late reform period than previously.

While the first two sets (Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b) pertain to marriage and motherhood penalties on women's careers and are generally applicable to other societies (see similar studies in China by Cao and Hu [2007]; Mu and Xie [2016]; Sun and Chen [2017]; Zhang and Hannum [2015]), the third set aims to empirically verify our key argument on how the impact of marriage and motherhood on women's careers has changed during the market transition in urban China.

## **Data, Variables, Measures and Methods**

### *Data*

The empirical analyses are based on data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) conducted in 2008 (CGSS2008 hereafter). The CGSS is a national

representative survey conducted annually/biennially since 2003, which targets adults aged 18 or above throughout China except Tibet. A multistage stratified random sampling method is used in the survey. First, 125 principal sampling units (PSUs) are selected from 2,798 counties or county-level districts, stratified by region, rural and urban populations, and education levels; then, four second-level sampling units (SSUs) are selected from each selected PSU and two third-level sampling units (TSUs) are selected from each selected SSU. Finally, ten households are selected from each selected TSU. One eligible person aged 18 or above is randomly selected from each sampled household to serve as the survey respondent. The CGSS 2008 includes 6,000 completed interviews, with 3,982 from urban areas and 2,018 from rural areas, and the response rate is 54.3 percent (Bian and Li 2012). Urban and rural samples can be weighted to yield the nationally representative results.

Compared to other waves of the CGSS, the 2008 survey gathered retrospective data on respondents' life histories, including family composition, marriage, education, employment, and others—ideal for our research purpose.<sup>1</sup> Since the occupations in rural areas are homogeneous (mostly farmers and some unskilled laborers), and the rate of job mobility is low, we restrict the analysis to the urban sample.<sup>2</sup> After deleting

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<sup>1</sup> Given the lack of panel data covering most of the period study (the first household panel survey project, the China Family Panel Survey [CFPS], was launched in 2010), retrospective survey data are sub-optimal, and the information solicited in the retrospective survey is largely consistent with historical statistics, even for income (Zhou 2000, 1147-48). Compared to income, promotion and job exit, as well as marriage and childbirth, are all important life events, and recall errors may not be substantial.

<sup>2</sup> Indeed, in the design of the CGSS, the urban population was oversampled relative to the rural population to take the higher level of heterogeneity of the urban population into account.

those who have never worked, we are left with 2,278 individuals in the analytical sample.

### *Variables and Measures*

There are two dependent variables in this study. The first dependent variable is whether or not one has experienced upward mobility, and the second dependent variable is whether or not one has exited from the labor force. We define upward mobility based on job characteristics such as promotion in the professional or administrative ranks or an increase in occupational status measured by the International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). A labor market exit was recorded if an individual reported having had a job in one time period but was no longer working in the subsequent one. Both dependent variables are coded as dummies (1 if yes and 0 otherwise).<sup>3</sup>

Family status includes marriage and having dependent children (from 0 to 5 years old), two important life events that affect women's involvement in paid work. The survey collected information on both marital status and the year of the first marriage, so marital status is a time-variant covariate (1=married and 0=otherwise).<sup>4</sup> Presence of dependent children is constructed based on children's current age with

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<sup>3</sup> Our analysis does not include re-employment, in spite of its importance. Similar to demotion, one reason is that too few individuals re-entered the labor force once they had exited. According to Zhang (2003), the re-employment rate in China was very low, even for those laid-off workers during the economic restructuring in the late 1990s. Moreover, women's re-employment decisions were found less responsive to public subsidies but more responsive to family circumstances (Giles et. al. 2006).

<sup>4</sup> Almost all cases remain so because the divorce rate was very low during the entire period of study.

reference to the respondent's employment history. Whether the respondent was having dependent children is thus also a time-variant covariate. It is coded as 0 before a child was born and after the child reached 6 years old.

We include education, party membership, and *hukou* status (urban vs. rural origins) in the analysis, as they are all proved to be important predictors of career mobility in urban China (e.g., Walder, Li and Treiman 2000; Wu and Treiman 2007). The CGSS also solicited information on respondent's education history, *hukou* status change, the timing of joining the Chinese Communist Party. They are all time-variant covariates. Education is coded into a set of dummy variables (1 = primary school or below; 2 = junior high school; 3= senior high school; and 4= college or above). Both party membership and rural *hukou* status are coded as binary variables (1 if yes and 0 otherwise). Because our analytical sample covers those who ever had a job and their subsequent job changes may be contingent upon the kind of job they started from the beginning, we include the ISEI of the respondents' first job as the control.

We include work-unit sector in the analysis, and code government/party agency, public institution, state owned enterprise, collective enterprise as the public sector and the rest as the non-public sector. This is a time-variant binary variable (1=public sector and 0=otherwise). Previous studies have shown that the job shift pattern in urban China varies across types of organizations and economic sectors (Zhou, Tuma and Moen 1997), and that the gender earnings gap is smallest in government/public institutions, followed by public enterprises, and then private enterprises in urban China (He and Wu 2018). We expect that similar patterns apply to promotion and job exit.

Considering the impact of economic reform on an individual's life course, we code the year in which individuals switched jobs into three stages: 1=1978-1992, 2=1993-1998, and 3=1999-2008. Stage 1 (1978-1992) is the initial period when the market sector gradually emerged but still accounted for a negligible portion of China's economy. In Stage 2 (1993-1998), the pace of marketization accelerated following then the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's southern China tour in 1992 to call for further reform. During this stage the private sector grew exponentially and its importance in the national economy increased dramatically. In Stage 3 (1999-2008), state-owned enterprises underwent dramatic restructuring to increase efficiency. Many of them were even privatized, especially earlier in the 2000s (Xu and Wu 2018), while others behaved more like private firms than before.

#### *Methods and Analytical Strategy*

Job mobility serves as an important mechanism for individuals to accumulate advantages or disadvantages in labor markets over the life course. To reveal the dynamic relationship between marriage, childbirth, and job change, we employ event history models, specifically, the discrete-time logit models. These models offer flexibility in examining the impact of both time-invariant and time-variant covariates on job mobility and account for the fact that the time of upward mobility and job exit are measured discretely (Allison 2014). Here, we treat upward mobility as a repeated event, as an individual may experience upward mobility more than once.

To estimate the models, individual-level survey data must be restructured to personal-year records (for details, please refer to Allison, 2014). The risk set is those individuals who have ever held a job. The clock starts at the time when individuals started the first job, or 1978 if they started the first job before the reform, as our key

interest is to examine the varying impact of family related events in response to rapid social changes, captured by different reform stages. Such left censoring problems can be handled by the discrete-time logit models (Allison 2014). The person-year records end if the respondent left the labor force or was right-censored before he or she reached age 55 if there has been no status change.<sup>5</sup> In the end, we obtain 35,330 person-year records for the following analysis.

The pattern of job mobility is shaped by two-level factors. At the macro level, structural changes exert a massive impact on individuals' job mobility, and this impact differs between men and women. At the individual level, family-related events such as getting married and childbirth exert additional pressure on women to fulfill their traditional roles in the private sphere.

In the restructured data of person-year records, respondent's age is a time-variant variable. As a standard practice in event history models, we include age as a set of dummy variables to capture the nonlinear effect of the duration of respondents' exposure to the risk of event occurrence on job change. Moreover, to account for multiple time spells of each individual, we adjust the clustering effect of individuals.

While this article is mainly focused on women's careers, we conduct the analyses for women's and men's subsamples separately for comparisons. In the following, to see how family-related events affect women and men's job mobility differentially, we first estimate models without the interaction (Models 1a and 1b) as baseline models.

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<sup>5</sup> The mandatory retirement age in China is 55 years old for women and 60 for men, and the two life-course events (getting married and childbirth) of interest to us generally take place early in life (Song, Sicular, and Gustafsson 2017).

We then interact family-related events in Models 2a and 2b (i.e., marriage and having dependent children) with reform stage to examine how the effects of family events vary over time. Finally, to test the statistical significance of the difference between estimated coefficients for women's and men's subsamples, we run regression models on the pooled sample with full interaction between female dummy and all other independent variables. Only the coefficients that pass the significance tests ( $p < .01$ ) are marked in Models 3a and 3b.

## **Empirical Findings**

### *Descriptive Statistics*

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the selected variables for individual-level records in Panel A and person-year records in Panel B. As shown, there are significant gender differences in the type of mobility based on both individual-level and person-year records. For instance, 21.83 percent of men but only 12.8 percent of women have ever experienced upward mobility, whereas 26.35 percent of men and 39.23 percent of women have left the labor market. The annual upward mobility rate is 1.84 percent for men and 0.95 percent for women, and the annual exit rate is 1.65 percent and 2.66 percent for men and women respectively (Panel B). Clearly, women are less likely than men to experience upward mobility but more likely to exit from the labor force. Two-sample t-tests show gender differences in the two job mobility outcomes are both statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ).

[Table 1 about Here]

In our analytical sample, more than 82 percent of respondents are married and gender difference is negligible ( $p = 0.526$ ). However, in the person-year records, the

annual stock of marital rate is 74.07 percent for men and 77.05 for women ( $p < .001$ ), suggesting that marriage in China has been nearly universal but women get married earlier than men. In addition, women also differ from men in education, party membership, work sector, and *hukou* status. Compared to men, women are less educated, and less likely to be party members and to hold urban *hukou* status. However,

To intuitively demonstrate the divergent career paths of men and women, we first plot the kernel density graphs in Figure 1, based on the international socio-economic index (ISEI) of an individual's first occupation and current (or last) one. While the gender gap in occupational ISEI is negligible for the first occupation ( $p = 0.419$ ), women clearly lag behind in occupational status in current (or last) occupation ( $p < .001$ ).

[Figure 1 about Here]

To further demonstrate the differential effects of marriage on men and women, we plot the non-parametric smoothed hazard function for upward job mobility and labor market exit in Figure 2. In each graph, the dashed line represents individuals who are not married, while the solid line refers to those who are married. As we can see, married women are less likely than unmarried women to experience upward career mobility and more likely to withdraw from the labor force. The effect is statistically significant, based on log-rank and the Wilcoxon test ( $p < .01$ ). For men, the effect of marriage is much smaller. Marriage has no significant impact on their likelihood of withdrawing from the labor force. As with women, married men are also less likely to experience upward mobility. This finding seems to contradict the wage premium of fatherhood previously reported (e.g., Killewald 2013; Loh 1996;

Lundberg and Rose 2000). A plausible explanation is that lower rates of upward mobility indicate a longer duration between promotions, and promotion rates are generally higher earlier in one's career but lower after marriage. The effect of marriage on men's job exit is not statistically significant.

[Figure 2 about Here]

### *Results from Event History Analysis*

#### 1. The Effect of Marriage

Table 2 presents the results of discrete-time event history analysis on the effect of marriage on the likelihood of upward job mobility. The left two columns are baseline models for women and men, respectively (Models 1a and 2a). Not surprisingly, consistent with what have been found before (Walder, Li and Treiman 2000), results show that education increases their likelihood of upward mobility for both men and women. Party members are more likely than non-party members to experience upward mobility. Notably, those working in the public sector are more likely to experience upward mobility than those working in the non-public sector, probably because the public sector in urban China can provide a longer ladder of careers than the private sector. Holding constant the other factors, marriage has a negative impact on the likelihood of upward job mobility, especially for women. The net odds of upward mobility for married women are only 59.2 percent ( $e^{-0.525}$ ) of those for unmarried women, and the difference is statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ), whereas the net odds of upward mobility for married men are 73.5 percent ( $e^{-0.308}$ ) of those for unmarried men, and the difference is marginally significant ( $p < .10$ ). Clearly, there exists a marriage penalty on women's careers. Hypothesis 1a is supported.

[Table 2 about Here]

To demonstrate how the impact of marriage on career mobility changes over time, we include interaction terms between marital status and reform stages, and results are presented in Models 2a for women and Model 2b for men. For women, while the impact of marriage on one's likelihood of upward mobility does not differ between the second reform stage (1993-1998) and the early reform stage (1978-1992), the negative impact of marriage increased dramatically in the late reform stage (1999-2008). Compared to the early reform stage, for women, the net odds of marriage on upward mobility in the late reform stage (1999-2008) are only 45.0 percent ( $e^{-0.798}$ ) of those in the early reform stage (1978-1992), and the difference is statistically significant ( $p < 0.1$ ). The negative effect of marriage on women's career development in Model 1a is mainly due to the change in the late reform stage (1999-2008). Hypotheses 3a is thus supported. For men, the likelihood of experiencing upward mobility does not differ across reform stages.

Finally, to test the statistical significance of the difference between estimated coefficients for women's and men's subsamples, we run regression models on the pooled sample with full interaction between gender and all other independent variables (Models 1c and 2c). As shown in the table, only the coefficients of public sector differ significantly between men and women ( $p < .001$ ). In other words, the impact of public sector on the likelihood of upward mobility is stronger for women than for men. Other things being equal, the odds of experiencing upward mobility in the public sector are 2.36 times ( $e^{0.859}$ ) the odds in the non-public sector for women and only 1.15 times ( $e^{0.137}$ ) for men. This is consistent with the empirical findings about gender earnings inequality across different sectors, which are employed to

approximate the impact of marketization (Wu and Song 2014; He and Wu 2017).

With the structural change of employment from the public to the private sectors, women are victimized in their career development.

Similarly, we replicate the analyses of the job exit in Table 3. As shown in the baseline model (Models 3a), married women are more likely than unmarried women to withdraw from the labor force, the net odds of the former are 2.65 times ( $e^{0.973}$ ) of the latter ( $p < .001$ ). Marital status does not have significant effect on the likelihood of men's job exit, however (Model 3b). These findings lend support to Hypotheses 1b, namely, that women are more likely to leave the labor force after getting married.

The temporal trend of job exit is even more evident than that of upward mobility for both women and men. As the reform proceeds, due to the gradual retreat of state protection and dismantling of the work unit system, people are more likely to leave the labor force in both the later reform stages (1993-1998) and (1999-2008) than in the early reform stage (1978-1992), even after controlling for the effects of other attributes. Again, we further include interaction terms between marriage and reform stages in Models 4a and 4b. Results show that for women, the effects of marital status are more prominent in the later reform stages (1993-1998) and (1999-2008) than in the early one. Again, for men, the impact of marital status does not vary across different reform stages. Thus Hypothesis 3a is supported.

[Table 3 about Here]

To visualize the gendered pattern on how transition to marriage would influence individuals' job mobility, as revealed in Tables 2 and 3, we plot Figure 3. As clearly shown in the figure, the gaps between married women and unmarried women in

upward mobility and job exit increase across different reform stages, especially in the latest reform stage (1999-2008), and massive layoffs resulted from the restructuring of state-owned enterprises in the 1990s affecting married women's job exits in particular.

[Figure 3 about Here]

## 2. The Effect of Having Dependent Children

In the East Asia context, non-marital births are rarely seen, and childbirth often follows marriage (Raymo, Park, Xie and Yeung 2015). From the life course perspective, the presence of dependent children may have an impact on women's careers, independent of marital status. In this section, we examine the impact of having dependent children age 0-6 on the likelihood of upward mobility and job exit so as to test Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b.<sup>6</sup> Table 4 presents estimated coefficients for the discrete-time logit models. In addition to the control variables previously mentioned, we also introduce respondents' education relative to their spouse's as the control and thus essentially restrict the analytical sample to those who have ever married.

[Table 4 about Here]

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<sup>6</sup> Alternatively, we can classify children into 4 groups: no children, children aged 0-6, children aged 9-14, and children aged 15 or above. Results show that having children, regardless of whether they are dependent children or not, would lower women's chances of upward mobility as the reform proceeds, whereas having dependent children would make women more likely to withdraw from the labor force. Results are available upon request.

In the baseline models (Models 5a and 5b), having dependent children does not show a significant effect on the upward mobility for both men and women. However, in the models with interaction terms between having dependent children and reform stages (Models 6a and 6b), results show that women who have dependent children are 52.2 percent ( $=1-e^{-0.651}$ ) less likely to experience upward job mobility in the late reform stage (1999-2008) than in the early reform stage (1978-1992), and such a difference is marginally significant ( $p<.10$ ). For men, the positive coefficient of the interaction term suggests that they are more likely to experience upward mobility after having dependent children.

Similarly, results in Table 5 show that married women are more likely to leave the labor force if they have dependent children, and this is even more the case in the late reform stages than in the early reform stage. Women who have children are 2.24 ( $=e^{0.808}$ ) and 2.42 ( $=e^{0.881}$ ) times more likely to leave the labor market in 1993-1998 and 1999-2008, respectively, than in the early reform stage (1978-1992). On the contrary, having dependent children does not affect men's likelihood of leaving the workforce, though the effect is not statistically significant. These results lend support to Hypotheses 2b and 3b.

[Table 5 about Here]

The findings above are plotted in Figure 4, based on Models 6a and 6b in Table 4 and Models 8a and 8b in Table 5. Clearly, we can see that as the reform proceeds, the gaps in the likelihood of both experiencing upward mobility and exit from the labor force tend to increase between women who have dependent children and those who do not. Such patterns are not found among men.

[Figure 4 about Here]

## **Conclusions and Discussions**

The second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century has witnessed a steady increase in women's education and labor force participation in Western countries, and the gender earnings gap has been substantially reduced (Goldin 1990). Nevertheless, gender inequality in labor markets persists, and scholars have increasingly pointed to women's roles in marriage and the family as constraints on their career development. As more women are engaged in productive work in labor markets, the hindering effects of their reproductive role become even more evident than before. To illustrate the tension between women's market work and family responsibilities, we adopted the analytical framework of public-private spheres as the starting point to our investigation of how women's careers are contingent upon their entrenched roles within families. Various social and family policies in the welfare states have thus been instituted to ease women's role conflict between paid work (in the public sphere) and household work (in the private sphere) associated with the separation, thus moving towards more converging and integrated spheres to promote gender equality in those countries.

China's transition from a redistributive economy to a market economy has provided a unique historical setting to show how the move in an opposite direction towards the separation has affected the dynamics of gender inequality (Wu 2019). While the socialist state had long advocated gender egalitarianism and women's participation in economic production in the public sphere, the tension between women's productive and reproductive responsibilities had, to a large extent, been alleviated by the work unit system, serving a role similar to the welfare state by integrating private and public/state spheres through the provision of childcare, social

service, and other family-support programs (Zuo and Bian 2001). The fundamental restructuring of the state-owned enterprises in the mid-1990s aimed to transform work units to be more efficient and profit-driven entities, leaving the reproductive responsibilities to the private family, thus facilitating the separation of the public and private spheres, and escalating work-family conflicts, especially for women with children.

From the perspective of the sphere separation process, we examine the effects of marriage and dependent children on women's career mobility in urban China, and in particular, how these effects have changed in different reform stages. Based on the life history data from the CGSS 2008 and discrete-time logit models in event history analysis, we found that women's careers are more adversely affected by marriage and having dependent children than men's careers. Consistent with what have been found on wage the penalty of marriage and parenthood in China and elsewhere, women are more likely to withdraw from the labor force to fulfill their roles as wives and mothers and are less likely to experience upward mobility. More importantly, this pattern is more prominent in the late reform stage (1999-2008) than in earlier ones, when the restructuring of the state-owned enterprises and radical privatization have stripped off much of the social function of the work unit. The impact of marketization on women's careers has also been supported by the evidence that they are more likely to experience upward mobility and less likely to withdraw from the labor force in the public sector than in the non-public sector, and the sectoral differences in the career outcomes are significantly larger for women than for men.

Therefore, our research on job mobility patterns has confirmed previous findings based on the analysis of the gender pay gap that marketization has pushed women into

more disadvantaged positions in the labor market (e.g., He and Wu 2018; Song, Sicular and Gustafsson 2017). As most workers are paid through specific jobs, mobility among different jobs is crucial to understanding how the accumulated advantages/disadvantages in earnings are generated over individuals' the life course (Zhang and Hannum 2015). While the analyses here mainly rely on the retrospective survey data on individual men and women's job history, we hope that earnings and career information of both individuals and their spouses over time could be available to uncover the more nuanced career trajectory in the future research of this line (Ji and Wu 2018).

Our research also charted a distinct pathway through which the withdrawal of the state could affect gender stratification dynamics in urban China. Whereas the observed enlarging gender gaps in employment and earnings are often attributable to marketization, most scholars tend to account for the processes in the labor market, such as employers' gender discrimination, or occupational gender segregation (He and Wu 2017; Li and Xie 2015). We highlighted how marketization has altered institutional arrangements (work units) between work and family in the two-sphere framework, i.e., the interaction between the private and public spheres, to affect women's career mobility and labor market outcomes.

More broadly, we place the empirical analyses of the changing penalty of marriage and motherhood on women's careers within the framework of two-sphere separation and advance this line of literature by showing that the separation is historically specific, and the sphere boundary varies by societal contexts. In contrast with the historical experience of Western welfare states that social and family policies help create more converging and integrated spheres, the economic marketization and

transformation of work units in urban China have presented a unique case of sphere separation, which bears important implications for understanding the dynamics of gender inequality. While the state once could implement its egalitarian policies via all-encompassing work units to support working women, it no longer works effectively following the dismantling of the work unit system after decades of reform. Notably, there have not been any legal regulations established on hiring or wage discrimination, nor any nationwide social policies to support working mothers in China (He and Wu 2017). To check the rampant gender discrimination and promote gender equality in the labor markets, social and family policies are expected to play a more important role in the new welfare regime after the work unit.

Finally, our account of how marketization affects gender inequality in the labor market through sphere separation is built upon the assumption that gender norms are deeply rooted in the patriarchal tradition of Confucianism persisting, neither being undermined by the state intervention in Mao's era nor being transformed by women's improvement in education in the past decades (Ji et al 2017; Wolf 1985). This assumption, nevertheless, is subject to empirical verification in the long run. Future research should incorporate changing gender ideology into the framework of sphere separation in understanding different stratification outcomes between men and women in contemporary China.

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
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
**Figure 1. Kernel Density of Gender Differences in ISEI of First Job and Current/Last Job, Urban China**



*Data source:* Chinese General Social Survey, 2008


*Note:* Only individuals age 18 or above (excluding students) residing in urban areas are included.

**Figure 2. Smoothed Hazard and Survival Function of Job Change by Gender**




Notes: \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . The log-rank test weighs all time points equally, while the Wilcoxon test gives higher weights to earlier time points. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* means that transition to marriage would significantly men/women's chances of experiencing upward mobility/job exit.

**Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Job Change by Marital Status**



Note: The figures are drawn from the right panel of female and male models in Table 2 and Table 3.

**Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Job Change by Having Dependent Children**



Note: The figures are drawn from the right panel of female and male models in Table 4 and Table 5.

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables (Person-Year), CGSS 2008**

	Full Sample	Women	Men	Diff.	p-Value
Panel A: Individual records					
Ever upward mobility	17.37	12.83	21.85	-	0.000
Ever exit	32.69	39.23	26.25	+	0.000
Married	82.17	81.85	82.48	-	0.526
Have dependent children (age 0-6)	81.01	82.11	79.92	+	0.124
Education					
<=Primary	13.31	15.56	11.09	+	0.000
Junior High	28.73	30.52	26.97	+	0.031
Senior High	33.65	32.91	34.38	-	0.392
>=College	24.31	21.01	27.56	-	0.000
Party member	16.78	9.77	23.69	-	0.000
Rural <i>hukou</i>	19.06	21.14	16.99		0.004
Public sector	39.31	39.91	38.72	-	0.506
N	3,028	1,504	1,524		
Panel B: Person-year records					
Job Mobility					
Upward mobility	1.41	0.95	1.84	-	0.000
Exit	2.13	2.66	1.65	+	0.000
Reform stage					
1978-1992	42.69	43.22	42.20	+	0.025
1993-1998	25.96	25.86	26.05	-	0.648
1999-2008	31.35	30.91	31.75	-	0.051
Time Variant Covariates					
Married	75.50	77.05	74.07	+	0.000
Have dependent children (age 0-6)	26.60	26.16	27.00	+	0.040
Party member	15.02	8.48	21.05	-	0.000
Public sector	22.90	22.08	23.66	-	0.002
Rural <i>hukou</i>	15.35	16.04	14.71		0.000
Age	34.11	33.9	34.31	-	0.000
	(9.73)	(9.79)	(9.66)		
Person-year	46,341	22,221	24,120		

*Notes:* Figures are percentages, except for age (standard deviation in the parentheses); “Diff” refers to female-male differences, with positive signs indicating that percentages for women are greater than those for men, and negative signs vice versa.

**Table 2. Discrete-time Logit Model Estimating the Effect of Marriage on  
Upward Job Mobility, CGSS 2008**

Variables	Model 1a Women	Model 1b Men	Model 1c Sig	Model 2a Women	Model 2b Men	Model 2c Sig
Marriage	-0.525** (0.201)	-0.308† (0.165)		-0.122 (0.305)	-0.121 (0.198)	
Reform stage(ref.=1978-1992)						
1993-1998	0.005 (0.190)	-0.061 (0.124)		-0.047 (0.389)	0.161 (0.222)	
1999-2008	0.163 (0.178)	-0.091 (0.116)		0.679* (0.296)	0.125 (0.206)	
Interaction						
Marriage *1993-1998				0.062 (0.438)	-0.325 (0.269)	
Marriage *1999-2008				-0.798* (0.344)	-0.309 (0.245)	
Education(ref: <=primary)						
Junior High	0.619+ (0.373)	0.585* (0.276)		0.640† (0.374)	0.603* (0.277)	
Senior High	0.999** (0.362)	1.030*** (0.269)		1.018** (0.363)	1.057*** (0.271)	
>=College	1.495*** (0.402)	1.573*** (0.282)		1.532*** (0.404)	1.591*** (0.283)	
Party Member	0.852*** (0.205)	0.794*** (0.116)		0.839*** (0.204)	0.793*** (0.116)	
Public Sector	0.859*** (0.147)	0.137 (0.117)	***	0.823*** (0.150)	0.121 (0.118)	***
ISEI of 1st Occupation	0.051 (0.048)	-0.004 (0.031)		0.047 (0.048)	-0.006 (0.031)	
Age Dummies						
Constant	-6.642*** (1.056)	-6.029*** (0.776)		-6.873*** (1.072)	-6.147*** (0.780)	
Observations	20,728	23,946		20,728	23,946	
Log-Likelihood	-1103.331	-2088.320		-1099.616	-2087.252	
Chi-Square	187.68	258.23		208.39	262.70	

*Notes:* †  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In consideration of its nonlinear form, age dummies are added.

**Table 3. Discrete-time Logit Model Estimating the Effect of Marriage on Job Exit, CGSS 2008**

VARIABLES	Model 3a Women	Model 3b Men	Model 3c Sig	Model 4a Women	Model 4b Men	Model 4c Sig
Marriage	0.973*** (0.183)	0.094 (0.175)	**	0.382 (0.245)	0.143 (0.266)	
Reform stage(ref.=1978-1991)						
1993-1998	1.270*** (0.128)	0.952*** (0.144)		0.704** (0.241)	0.976*** (0.237)	
1999-2008	1.701*** (0.129)	1.431*** (0.142)		1.164*** (0.213)	1.486*** (0.225)	
Interaction						
Marriage *1993-1998				0.786** (0.284)	-0.040 (0.297)	*
Marriage *1999-2008				0.752** (0.254)	-0.084 (0.274)	*
Education(ref: <=primary)						
Junior High	-0.294* (0.119)	-0.161 (0.164)		-0.309** (0.120)	-0.157 (0.165)	
Senior High	-0.668*** (0.130)	-0.452** (0.169)		-0.685*** (0.131)	-0.447** (0.170)	
>=College	-1.656*** (0.227)	-1.549*** (0.247)		-1.673*** (0.227)	-1.547*** (0.248)	
Party Member	-0.326 (0.249)	-0.397* (0.176)		-0.317 (0.250)	-0.399* (0.176)	
Public Sector	0.317** (0.103)	-0.164 (0.125)	***	0.337*** (0.102)	-0.167 (0.125)	***
ISEI of 1st Occupation	-0.080* (0.037)	-0.050 (0.041)		-0.077* (0.037)	-0.050 (0.041)	
Age Dummies	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Constant	-7.219*** (1.035)	-4.696*** (0.530)		-6.842*** (1.035)	-4.721*** (0.540)	
Observations	22,069	24,096		22,069	24,096	
Log-Likelihood	-2441.001	-		-	-1903.2815	
		1903.3282		2436.122		
				4		
Chi-Square	555.79	247.25		544.96	249.73	

Notes: †  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In consideration of its nonlinear form, age dummies are added.

**Table 4. Discrete-time Logit Model Estimating the Effect of Having Children on Upward Job Mobility, CGSS 2008**

VARIABLES	Model 5a Women	Model 5b Men	Model 5c Sig	Model 6a Women	Model 6b Men	Model 6c Sig
Have Dependent Children	0.036 (0.181)	0.077 (0.129)		0.409 (0.277)	-0.072 (0.177)	*
Reform stage(ref.=1978-1991)						
1993-1998	-0.013 (0.199)	-0.075 (0.128)		0.208 (0.253)	-0.069 (0.150)	
1999-2008	0.147 (0.199)	-0.110 (0.125)		0.385 (0.252)	-0.274 <sup>†</sup> (0.150)	*
Interaction						
Dependent Children*1993-1998				-0.579 (0.428)	-0.070 (0.294)	
Dependent Children*1999-2008				-0.651 <sup>†</sup> (0.384)	0.517* (0.257)	*
Education(ref: <=primary)						
Junior High	0.557 (0.376)	0.487 <sup>+</sup> (0.281)		0.533 (0.376)	0.487 <sup>†</sup> (0.281)	
Senior High	0.949* (0.371)	0.976*** (0.278)		0.926* (0.370)	0.981*** (0.277)	
>=College	1.499*** (0.424)	1.597*** (0.292)		1.498*** (0.424)	1.593*** (0.292)	
Relative Education (ref: Husband=Wife)						
Husband>Wife	0.066 (0.182)	0.023 (0.114)		0.071 (0.182)	0.018 (0.114)	
Husband<Wife	-0.143 (0.188)	0.325* (0.163)		-0.143 (0.188)	0.325* (0.162)	
Party Member	0.915*** (0.220)	0.798*** (0.119)		0.913*** (0.222)	0.806*** (0.119)	
Public Sector	0.751*** (0.165)	0.101 (0.128)	**	0.747*** (0.166)	0.103 (0.128)	**
ISEI of 1st Occupation	0.058 (0.055)	-0.014 (0.033)		0.059 (0.055)	-0.015 (0.033)	
Age Dummies	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Constant	-6.924*** (1.042)	-6.243*** (0.769)		-7.119*** (1.048)	-6.154*** (0.774)	
Observations	18,076	21,681		18,076	21,681	
Log-Likelihood	-930.549	-1904.973		-928.829	-1902.345	
Chi-Square	145.03	234.90		149.26	240.28	

Notes: <sup>†</sup>  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In consideration of its nonlinear form, age dummies are added.

**Table 5. Discrete-time Logit Model Estimating the Effect of Having Dependent Children on Labor Market Exit, CGSS 2008**

VARIABLES	Model 7a Women	Model 7b Men	Model 7c Sig	Model 8a Women	Model 8b Men	Model 8c Sig
Have Dependent Children	0.093 (0.128)	0.062 (0.151)		-0.601* (0.268)	0.136 (0.247)	*
Reform stage(ref.=1978-1992)						
1993-1998	1.292*** (0.136)	0.955*** (0.152)	†	1.075*** (0.151)	0.894*** (0.184)	
1999-2008	1.828*** (0.137)	1.433*** (0.153)		1.589*** (0.150)	1.533*** (0.178)	
Interaction						
Dependent Children*1993-1998				0.808* (0.318)	0.235 (0.317)	
Dependent Children*1999-2008				0.881** (0.302)	-0.382 (0.315)	**
Education(ref: <=primary)						
Junior High	-0.251+ (0.130)	-0.182 (0.181)		-0.238+ (0.130)	-0.182 (0.181)	
Senior High	-0.747*** (0.145)	-0.558** (0.190)		-0.733*** (0.145)	-0.565** (0.191)	
>=College	-1.771*** (0.255)	-1.675*** (0.277)		-1.772*** (0.255)	-1.677*** (0.278)	
Relative Education (ref: Husband=Wife)						
Husband>Wife	0.013 (0.103)	0.346** (0.123)		0.006 (0.104)	0.351** (0.123)	
Husband<Wife	0.296* (0.128)	-0.058 (0.168)		0.292* (0.128)	-0.058 (0.169)	
Party Member	-0.369 (0.263)	-0.422* (0.182)		-0.367 (0.261)	-0.424* (0.182)	
Public Sector	0.300** (0.107)	-0.239+ (0.140)	**	0.303** (0.106)	-0.228 (0.140)	**
ISEI of 1 <sup>st</sup> Occupation	-0.081* (0.039)	-0.046 (0.043)		-0.082* (0.039)	-0.045 (0.043)	
Age Dummies						
Constant	Yes -6.232*** (1.017)	Yes -4.649*** (0.499)		Yes -6.007*** (1.017)	Yes -4.713*** (0.507)	
Observations	19,190	24,096		19,190	24,096	
Log-Likelihood	-2191.647	-1638.396		-2186.839	-1636.159	
Chi-Square	524.356	222.132		506.080	225.546	

Notes: †  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Individual characteristics include educational attainment (time-invariant), party membership and work sector (time-variant). In consideration of its nonlinear form, age dummies are added.